
Hackers hijacked 4,837 GitHub accounts and used them to probe 61,764 software repositories, planting a credential-stealing script researchers named wfx-loot in thousands of projects and stealing cloud secrets from at least 1,806 of them. The campaign, which began on Tuesday, November 10, 2026, is one of the largest supply-chain attacks ever seen on the world's biggest code-hosting platform
The attack began quietly, with what looked like routine housekeeping. From about 12:45 UTC on November 10, the hijacked accounts opened pull requests titled “docs: dependency audit notes” from branches named wfx-docs, aimed at 61,764 repositories. Each request probed whether the account had write access. Where the answer was yes, the attackers planted their payload.
The payload is a shell script of roughly 1,500 lines that researchers at Aikido Security named wfx-loot. It arrived by modifying an existing GitHub Actions workflow, by adding a new workflow on a short-lived branch, or by planting a malicious npm postinstall hook. In 771 repositories it arrived as an npm hook, so it executed on developers' own machines when they ran npm install.
GitHub hosts the code behind much of the modern internet, from small open-source libraries to the software running banks, hospitals and government agencies. Its Actions service automates testing and deployment, handing workflows powerful credentials. That convenience is also the risk: a single compromised workflow can expose the keys to a whole organisation.
The attackers did not need to break into GitHub itself. They arrived with valid credentials for 4,837 accounts and used them the way any legitimate contributor would. Some of the hijacked accounts belonged to Fortune 100 companies, the US General Services Administration, the French government, Nextcloud and WebdriverIO, according to BleepingComputer. How the credentials were stolen has not been published, and GitHub had issued no statement at the time of the reports.
Once it runs, wfx-loot sweeps up almost everything a developer's machine or a build pipeline can offer. It harvests GitHub Actions secrets and variables, the GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC and runtime tokens, and credentials for Git, SSH, GPG, Docker, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI, Vault and Terraform. It also collects environment variables, .env files, private keys and shell histories.
The stolen material is then put to work. The script exchanges GitHub OIDC tokens for temporary Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud sessions, and chains into additional cloud identity roles to mint long-lived AWS credentials. That turns a single stolen token into lasting access to a victim's cloud infrastructure.
In the 771 repositories where the payload arrived as a postinstall hook, it ran on developers' laptops during an ordinary npm install, reaching credentials that never pass through GitHub. Around 50 compromised accounts hold publishing rights on npm, PyPI, Go, crates and Packagist, raising the possibility of poisoned packages reaching more victims downstream.
Researchers who tracked the campaign described a disciplined, industrial-scale operation rather than a one-off intrusion. Aikido Security, which named the payload and traced its behaviour, confirmed the stealer had run and exfiltrated credentials from at least 1,806 repositories. SafeDep, which counted the malicious commits, put the number of repositories with poisoned default branches at 8,093 by November 12, a figure still rising as more commits were found.
The most striking finding was how little resistance the attackers met. About 92% of the probe pull requests were still open days later, meaning most repository owners had not noticed them. GitHub had issued no public statement at the time of the reports, leaving affected projects to rely on the researchers' published indicators to find and clean up the intrusion.
The attack matters because of what was stolen and where it can lead. Cloud credentials are the keys to modern infrastructure: with a long-lived AWS credential minted from a stolen token, an attacker can read databases, copy source code and move deeper into a company's network. The theft of Git, SSH and GPG keys and .env files hands over the same access developers use every day, making intrusions hard to spot.
It also matters because of who was hit. Open-source libraries sit underneath countless commercial products, and a poisoned package or workflow can pass the infection on to every project that depends on it. With about 50 compromised accounts holding publishing rights on the major registries, the campaign had a path from stolen GitHub credentials to software installed worldwide.
Repository owners should now check whether their projects received a pull request titled “docs: dependency audit notes” from a branch named wfx-docs, and whether any workflow file or package.json changed around November 10. Any credentials that could have passed through an affected workflow — GitHub tokens, cloud keys, npm and PyPI tokens, private keys — should be treated as compromised and rotated.
Researchers expect the count of affected repositories to keep rising, and the confirmed number of victims with stolen secrets is likely to grow beyond 1,835. GitHub is expected to face questions about how 4,837 accounts were hijacked and whether it will notify affected projects directly.
What is wfx-loot? A roughly 1,500-line shell script that steals credentials, named by researchers at Aikido Security. Attackers planted it in thousands of GitHub repositories using hijacked accounts.
How many accounts and repositories were affected? Attackers used 4,837 hijacked GitHub accounts to probe 61,764 repositories. By November 12, 8,093 had malicious commits on their default branches, and the stealer had run in at least 1,806.
What did wfx-loot steal? GitHub Actions secrets, GITHUB_TOKEN, OIDC and runtime tokens, Git, SSH, GPG, Docker, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI, Vault and Terraform credentials, environment variables, .env files, private keys and shell histories.
How did the attackers get in? They used stolen credentials for 4,837 GitHub accounts to open probe pull requests and plant the script through GitHub Actions workflows or npm postinstall hooks. How the credentials were originally stolen has not been published.
What should repository owners do? Check for pull requests titled “docs: dependency audit notes” from wfx-docs branches and workflow changes around November 10, remove any malicious code, and rotate every credential that could have passed through an affected workflow.
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